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BLACKS, DUE PROCESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
CLASH OF VALUES AS THE SUPREME COURT
MOVES TO THE RIGHT
By HENRY W. MCGEE, JR.
Professor of Law, UCLA
Some of the great provisions of the Constitution
lay dormant for large numbers of our people until
the Warren Court gave them life across the land.
Stare decisis. Let them be.




T HE ULTIMATE IRONY of the conserva-
tive Nixon Justices is the increasing
evidence of their radical disposition to
overturn past principle in quest of an effi-
cient and streamlined criminal justice sys-
tem. Led by its law enforcement-oriented
Chief Justice,2 an emerging majority3 of
the Court has managed to reverse or seri-
ously abridge precedents - both recent
and time-honored - which ensured some
fairness for minority defendants. Two
alarming decisions handed down at the
close of the Court's last term indicate that
the Black man may no longer be the spe-
cial ward of the Supreme Court.4 At best
he is now emancipated, at worst, or-
phaned. For the Court now seems ready
to ignore the very special impact of crim-
inal justice decisions on racial minorities.
The icy detachment of Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist's Moose Lodge opinion,5 in itself
perhaps only a disturbing symbol and af-
firmation of the persistent virus of racism,
has characterized the Court's abridgement
of the recently evolved right to a lawyer
at a lineup and the centuries-old right to
unanimous jury verdicts. The concern of
the Court for the oppressed seems to have
all but run its course.
1. Fahy, Book Review of Equal Justice: The Warren Era
of the Supreme Court by Arthur Goldberg, 67 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 146, 151 (1972).
2. "Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 65, may be the most
law-and-order-minded member of the bench, as well as
its most zealous advocate of judicial restraint. On a
number of occasions, he has written opinions inviting
Congress to deprive the courts of authority over cer-
tain subjects." L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1972, Pt. 1, at 18,
col. 1.
3. "[The Nixon] appointees are identifiable as a bloc. Last
term they voted together on 54 of the 67 cases in which
all four participated." Id.
4. As long ago as the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall 36,
71 (1872), the special Constitutional status of the Black
man was recognized by the Supreme Court when Mr.
Justice Miller declared that "the one pervading purpose
found in [the Civil War Amendments], lying at the
foundation of each, . . . [was] the freedom of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of the slave
race, the security and firm establishment of that free-
dom, and the protection of the newly made freeman
and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him."
Even scholars who believe that "neutrality" is the
best policy in racial matters concede that there is "some
historical support" for any claim by Blacks for "a place
as special ward of the Constitution." Kaplan, Segrega-
tion Litigation and the Schools - Part II: The Gen-
eral Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. Rev. 157, 186
(1963).
This is not the place to refight the war over judicial
neutrality, but Judge Skelly Wright has written with
special urgency about the Constitutional propriety of
special judicial concern for Blacks;
"Special protection of Negroes' rights, however
is not necessarily a breach of neutrality. So long as
the Court would have aided any group comparable
situated in our society it acts with the requisite neu-
trality. Just because no other group, given the ap-
palling history of slavery, black codes and compelled
segregation, may in fact be comparably situated does
not alter hte neutrality. Indeed, the three constitu-
tional amendments required to give the Negro equal
legal rights attest to the fact that no other group is
comparably situated.
"In other words, so long as the Court acts to pro-
tect any group whose legitimate interests are consis-
tently and shamefully neglected by the political pro-
cesses, it acts neutrally. The Court, then, protects
Negroes not simply because they are Negroes, or be-
cause the Justices think them especially worthy peo-
ple, but because their legitimate interests continue to
go unprotected elsewhere." Wright, The Role of the
Supreme Court in a Democratic Society - Judicial
Activisn or Restraint?, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 17
(1968).
5. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
The plaintiff, a prominent member of the Pennsylvania
State legislature, was refused service by the Moose
Lodge although he was the guest of a white member.
Justice Rehnquist "distinguished" Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1951), and held
that even though the state had issued a liquor license
to the Moose Lodge, there was no significant state in-
volvement in the private discriminatory scheme and
hence no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jus-
tices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall dissented, with
Douglas pointing out in his dissent the substantial state
support of the Moose Lodge's discriminatory practice,
and declaring that the "scarcity of licenses restricts the
ability of Blacks to obtain liquor, for liquor is com-
meTcially -available only at private clubs f n" a significant
portion of each week. Access by Blacks to places that
serve liquor is further limited by the fact that the state
quota [of liquor licenses] is filled. A group desiring to
form a nondiscriminatory club which would serve Blacks
must purchase a license held by an existing club, which
can exact a monopoly price for the transfer." 407 U.S.
at 182-183.
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A. Lineups: Police Only, No Lawyers
A llowed
Consider first Kirby v. Illinois,6 the
lawyerless lineup case. In a plurality
opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, 7 the
Court held that prior to indictment, or
formal charge, defendants do not have a
constitutional right to the presence of
counsel. In the space of but a few pages
of the United States Reports, the Court
undercut the necessity of what had be-
come routine practice in the judicial sys-
tems of nearly all the major metropolitan
areas-the assignment of Public Defend-
ers to participate in all lineups staged by
police prior to arraignment or the assign-
ment of counsel.8 The practice had been
premised on the assumption that United
States v. Wade9 and Gilbert v. Califor-
nia,10 two decisions as recent as 1967 ex-
cluding from trials any testimony stem-
ming from lineups held in the absence of
previously assigned or retained counsel,
also required that lawyers be present at
lineups whether fortuitously or purpose-
fully staged prior to the retention or ap-
pointment of counsel.
This recently developed practice under
the Wade-Gilbert reign and schema had
solid interpretative support in the deci-
sions of the state and federal courts. Thir-
teen state courts had held that lawyers
must be present at all lineups." Only five
states had refused to apply Wade to pre-
indictment lineups. 12 Moreover, of the
eight United States Court of Appeals that
had considered the question, all had ruled
that Wade required the same protection
for defendants before indictment afforded
them after the indictment and subsequent
appointment or retention of counsel.
13
Wade was a valiant attempt to counter-
act the "all Coons look alike to me" pre-
nomenon that has doomed so many
Black defendants. 14 The notorious unre-
liability of eyewitness identification 15 is
even more unreliable when a Black man
is at the wrong end of a pointing finger. 6
6. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
7. The deciding vote was cast by Mr. Justice Powell who,
however, did not join the opinion.
8. For instance, in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York,
public defenders are regularly assigned to cover lineups
to protect defendants who are unable to, or who have
not had an opportunity to retain counsel.
9. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
10. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
11. People v. Fowler, 461 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1969); State v.
Singleton, 215 So.2d 838 (La. 1968); Commonwealth
v. Guillory, 254 N.E.2d 427 (Mass. 1970); Palmer v.
State, 249 A.2d 482 (Md. 1969); People v. Hutton, 175
N.W.2d 860 (Mich. 1970); Thompson v. State, 451 P.2d
704 (Nev. 1969); State v. Wright, 161 S.E.2d 581 (N.C.
1968); State v. lsaacs, 265 N.W.2d 327 (Ohio 1970);
Commonwealth v. Whiting, 266 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1970);
In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1970); Martinez v.
State, 437 S.W. 2d 842 (Tex. 1969); State v. Hicks,
455 P.2d 943 (Wash. 1969), and Hayes v. State, 175
N.W.2d 625 (Wis. 1970).
12. State v. Fields, 455 P.2d 964 (Ariz. 1969); Perkins v.
State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969); Kirby v. Illinois, 257
N.E.2d 589 (1970); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817
(Mo. 1970), and Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 173 S.E.
792 (Va. 1970).
13. U.S. v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 D.C. Cit. 1970); Cooper
v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970); U.S. v. Ayers,
426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970); Government of Virgin
Islands v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3rd Cir. 1971);
Rivers v. U.S., 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968); U.S. v.
Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969); U.S. v.
Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1970), and Wilson v.
Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972).
14. Felix Frankfurter once wrote, "The old song, 'All
Coons Look Alike to Me,' represents a deep experience
of human fallibility." F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco
and Vanzetti 31-32 (1972).
See F. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 131-132
(Anchor ed. 1958), wherein Professor Allport declares:
"So overpowering is the impact of color upon our per-
ceptions that we frequently go no further in our judge-
ment of the face. An Oriental is an Oriental - whether
Chinese or Japanese we fail to determine. Nor do we
perceive the individuality of each face. While we are
usually frank in admitting that all Orientals look alike
to us we are scandalized to learn that a common com-
plaint on the part of Orientals is that 'Americans all
look alike.' One experiment dealing with memory for
Negro and white faces shows that people with a high
anti-Negro bias fail to recognize the faces of as many
individual Negroes whose photographs they have seen,
as well as they recognize the individual faces of whites."
15. "In his important book Convicting the Innocent, which
was published in 1932, E. M. Borchard had these ob-
servations to make about the causes of the appalling
miscarriages of justice (American and British) which
he related: 'Perhaps the major source of these tragic
errors is an identification of the accused by the victim of
a crime of violence. This mistake was practically alone
responsible for twenty-nine of these convictions' (out
of a total of sixty-five dealt with). Since then, quite a
number of false identifications have come to light; and
in 1961 the Lord Chief Justice felt himself called upon
to voice the warning that cases of identification were
difficult and could lead to a miscarriage of justice."
Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Pt.
1, (1963) Crim. L. Rev. 479 (1963).
Judge Jerome Frank has said that "erroneous identi-
fication of the accused constitutes the major cause of
the known wrongful convictions." J. Frank and B.
Frank, Not Guilty 61 (1957).
16. "The lineup situation or other police-sponsored con-
frontation between the accused and witnesses is, in fact,
inherently suggestive regardless of how fairly conducted.
A gross example of the type of suggestion possible
would be the presentation to an identifying witness of
a group of men in which the suspect was the only
Negro." Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identifi-
cation Proceedings: A Problemn in Effective Implenenta-
tion of an Expanding Constitution, 29 Pitt U. L. Rev.
65, 67 (1967).
A classic (and hopefully atypical) abuse of the lineup
is related in Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.
1966). The case involved an alleged rape by a Black
wearing a "purina chow bag" over his head and face
and an orange-colored shirt. The rapist supposedly had
a "high, childlike voice." Four or five Blacks were
placed in a lineup and made to speak so as to test the
victim's ability to identify voices. Thereafter she was
told by the police that they had arrested a "Negro"
suspect and wanted her to listen to his voice. Prior to
the voice test, the victim was shown an orange-colored
shirt which was taken from the accused. There was no
lineup and the victim was not permitted to view the
suspect, nor did the police provide any other Black
voices for comparison. The suspect and two police of-
ficers conversed in one room while the victim listened
from an adjoining room. After he repeated words al-
legedly used during the rape, the victim identified the
accused. The court condemned the proceedings as viola-
tive of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amen-
ment, and observed that "the highly suggestive atmos-
phere that had been generated could not have failed
to affect [the victim's] judgment." Id. at 201.
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Once identified, subsequent trials are of-
ten a mere formality and thus the lineup
oft-times is the most critical stage in crim-
inal cases where the identity of the crime's
perpetrator is the only significant issue of
fact.
17
Of course Wade was no radical break-
through. Rather the extension of the criti-
cal stage thesis to the all-important lineup
situation,'18 had its roots in a long line of
decisions in that incremental fashion
which has so characterized Supreme
Court (indeed, Anglo-American) juris-
prudence. 19 Though the Warren Court
held open the door of the police precinct
for the lawyer in Wade, the opinion went
only as far as the threshold, for it was
significantly silent as to the limits or
mode of participation by the lawyer in
the lineup.20 This essentially conservative
determination by the Warren Court pro-
voked a flurry of speculation among
commentators, 21 and as the Appendix to
this article indicates led to much dis-
agreement among lawyers as to their role
at the lineup proceeding.
But, at least, the principle and utility
of presence was affirmed by the Court.
And in support of the Court's assess-
ment of the value of monitoring lineups,
as the Appendix to this article also indi-
cates, lawyers had begun to develop a
diversified set of strategies and tactics to
protect the accused against misidentifica-
tion. The mechanics of the decision were
left to the practical exigencies of local
law enforcement and criminal justice sys-
tems. 22 Lower courts, too, were to etch in
the details of the confrontation between
lawyer and police at lineups. As indi-
cated, most of them decided that the
principle that required lawyers subse-
quent to formal charge, also required
counsel at lineups which were held before
the defendant could, in the normal
course, secure an attorney. Indeed, it
seems clear that lawyers are probably
more necessary at lineups prior to indict-
ment and the appointment of trial coun-
sel, than afterwards.23 For clearly the
knowledge that an attorney is present in
a case is likely to provoke a greater con-
sciousness and conscientiousness about
the rights of a prisoner.
With a pronounced proclivity for fine
distinctions, the Court declined to agree
with the terse one-sentence dissent of Mr.
Justice White who declared that Wade
17. "The cornerstone of the Court's decision in Wade was
the now familiar concept of the 'critical stage.' By this
analysis the right to counsel must arise 'at any stage of
the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out,
where counsel's absence might derogate the accused's
right to a fair trial. A pretrial identification, the Court
found, was such a stage because it was 'peculiarly rid-
dled with innumerable dangers and variable factors...'
This being so, 'the first line of defense must be the
prevention of unfairness and the lessening of the haz-
ards of eyewitness identification at the lineup itself.'
Since counsel might, the Court concluded, serve to
prevent unfairness, a criminal suspect had the right to
such assistance." Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 Yale
L. J. 390, 393 (1967), quoting phrases from U.S. v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 228, 235 (1967).
18. "[T]he decision superficially seems no more than a
logically demanded extension of the Court's recent
work." Id. at 393.
19. The decision had its origins in two currents of cases
that flow out of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) and White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) developed the prin-
ciple that any stage prior to trial could be "critical"
for the purpose of requiring the assistance of counsel
if significant rights, which counsel could protect, might
be jeopardized. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) provided the
concept that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
necessary to safeguard other Bill of Rights guarantees.
20. "The Court's failure to define the role of counsel at
the lineup or at least to suggest what counsel's duties
in 'averting prejudice' might involve, creates the po-
tential for considerable confusion as well as the possi-
bility of unnecessarily hampering the investigative util-
ity of the lineup process. Questions arise as to whether
counsel is to be perrmitted to interview the witnesses;
whether he may object to or forestall any or all parts
of the proceedings; whether he may require police to
provide him with a copy of the original description of
the criminal given by the witness; and whether he may
advise his client to refuse to perform some requested
act, or refuse to participate at all." Comment, Right to
Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Prob-
leni in Effective Implementation of an Expanding Con-
stitution, 29 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 65, 73-74 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 Yale L. J.
390 (1967); Note, Right to Counsel at Pretrial Police
Identification Proceedings: A Probleni in Ejfective
Implementation of an Expanding Constitution. 29 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 65 (1967); and Read, Lawyers at Lineups:
Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance?,
17 UCLA L. Rev. 339 19f9).
22. In what was to become an oft-employed Warren Court
strategy to allay criticism, Justice Brennan suggested
that legislatures or police departments could devise
procedures which would "eliminate the risks of abuse
and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and
the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial."
388 U.S. at 218.
Professort Anthony Amsterdam has said that in a
* . very recent development, the Court has begun to
couch its legislative holdings in terms that permit - in-
deed, invite - legislative or executive retraction of the
rights declared in the holdings . . . The Court may
well be feeling, and attempting to remedy, the difficul-
ties that a longtime subconstitutional lawlessness has
posed for its own lawmiaking in this area." Amsterdam,
The Supreme Court and the Rights oj Suspects in Crim-
inal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 785, 801 (1970).
23. "In both Wade and Gilbert the lineups were con-
ducted after indictments had been returned; in the
case at bar, the lineup occurred before petitioner had
been formally charged. But surely the assistance of
cousnsel, now established as -an absolusste post-indictment
right, does not arise or attach because of the return of
an indictment. The confrontation of a lineup ... can-
not have constitutional distinction based upon the
lodging of a formal clharge. Every reason set forth by
the Supreme Court in Wade . . . for the assistance of
counsel post-indictmeit has equal or more impact
when projected against a pre-indictment atmosphere.
We hold that petitioner had a right to counsel at the
lineup here considered." Chief Judge David T. Lewis
speaking for the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir.
1972).
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and Gilbert "govern this case and compel
reversal of the judgment of the Illinois
Supreme Court. 24 Speaking for himself,
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black-
mun and Rehnquist, Mr. Justice Stewart
reasoned that the Wade-Gilbert exclu-
sionary rule was ground solely in the
Sixth Amendment. Since in Stewart's
view, a person's Sixth Amendment rights
attach definitionally only at or after the
time adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated, no attorney was required
for lineups held before the filing of an
indictment. Justice Stewart escaped the
analogical force of Miranda's require-
ment of the presence of a lawyer at an
earlier stage in the criminal 'process, 25 by
finding that no problem of self-incrimina-
tion was involved at a lineup.26 This posi-
tion which had been taken by Mr. Justice
Brennan when he wrote the Wade de-
cision 27 ultimately returned to haunt him
in Kirby.
In abandoning defendants to un-moni-
tored police procedures prior to the ini-
tiation of judicial proceedings, the Court
characterized lineups as "routine police
investigation" and refused to "import"
into the initial stages of investigations
"an absolute constitutional guarantee his-
torically and rationally applicable only
after the onset of formal prosecutorial
proceedings. '28 The court thus drew a
sharp - and for many defendants, prob-
ably fatal - line between police investi-
gations and prosecutions.
To borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice
Brennan's characterization of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in Peo-
ple v. Fowler 9 requiring counsel at line-
ups prior to indictment, the Kirby major-
ity hardly had "an eye toward the real
world. '3 0 Quoting his majority opinion in
Wade, Justice Brennan's dissent pointed
out that ". . . 'it is a matter of common
experience that, once a witness has picked
out a the accused at the lineup, he is not
likely to go back on his word later on, so
that in practice the issue of identity may
... for all practical purposes be deter-
mined there and then, before the trial.' "31
Such was the apparent case in Kirby
where the petitioner and another suspect
were seated at a table in a room to which
the victim was brought by police. The
police, according to the robbery victim,
asked if the suspects were the robbers
and he said they were. At trial the prose-
cutor asked Willie Shard if he had posi-
tively identified the petitioner at the sta-
tion, and Shard of course responded in
the affirmative.
That the station house two-man "line-
up" occurred before Kirby and his com-
panion had obtained a lawyer, rather
than afterwards, made no difference
whatsoever in whether the Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia per se exclusionary rule should
have been followed, argued Brennan.
Again using language from his opinion in
Wade, Brennan said that rather than the
arbitrary and convenient line of com-
mencement of prosecution, the more
fundamental and controlling principle
for pretrial confrontations " '. . . requires
that we scrutinize any pre-trial confronta-
tion of the accused to determine whether
the presence of his counsel is necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to
a fair trial as affected by his right mean-
fully to cross-examine the witnesses
against him and to have effective assist-
ance of counsel at the trial itself.' "32
Denying that the lineup was a "mere"
preparatory and investigative stage like
gathering fingerprints, Brennan pointed
out that the dynamic nature of the lineup
mandated counsel's presence in a peculiar
and unique way. Again, from Wade,
Brennan argued:
24. 406 U.S. at 705.
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 486 (1966). Interestingly,
White seemed more bothered by Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1965) than Miranda, declaring that Esco-
bedo was "[tihe only seeming deviation from this long
line of constitutional decisions [holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings]. But Esco-
bedo is not apposite here for two distinct reasons. First,
the Court in retrospect perceived the 'prime purpose'
of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional
right to counsel as such, but like Miranda, 'to guaran-
tee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination . . .' Secondly, and perhaps even more important
for purely practical purposes, the Court has limited the
holding of Escobedo to its own facts .... and those
facts are not remotely akin to the facts of the case be-
fore us." 406 U.S. at 689.
26. 406 U.S. at 687-688.
27. 388 U.S. at 221.
28. 406 U.S. at 690.
29. People v. Fowler, 461 P. 2d 643 (Cal. 1969).
30. 406 U.S. at 699 N.8.
31. Id. at 700.
32. Id. at 694.
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"Insofar as the accused's conviction
may rest on a courtroom identification, in
fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial identi-
fication, which the accused is helpless to
subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the ac-
cused is deprived of that right of cross-ex-
amination which is an essential safeguard
to his right to confront the witnesses
against him . . . and even though cross-
examination is a precious safeguard to a
fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an abso-
lute assurance of accuracy and reliability
Thus in the present context, where so
many variables and pitfalls exist, the first
line of defense must be the prevention
of unfairness and the lessening of the
hazards of eye-witness identification at
the lineup itself. The trial which might
determine the accused's fate may well not
be that in the courtroom but that at the
pretrial confrontation, with the State align-
ed against the accused, the witness the sole
jury, and the accused unprotected against
the overreaching, intentional or uninten-
tional, and with little or no effective ap-
peal from the judgment there rendered
by the witness - 'that's the man'.
33
Why the plurality grounded its analy-
sis in the "abstract consideration of the
words 'criminal prosecutions' in the Sixth
Amendment" 34 rather than in the real
dangers of eyewitness identification is not
clear from Mr. Justice Stewart's rather
terse opinion. But perhaps Mr. Justice
Powell revealed the heart of the matter
when he observed in his one sentence,
"thus far and no further" concurrence,
that he would not "extend" the Wade-
Gilbert per se exclusionary rule.
35
B. Towards a Double Standard of
Justice: Two Versions of the
Sixth Amendment.
Justice Powell again joined his Nixon
bloc colleagues in the other decision un-
der consideration in this discussion, a rul-
ing even more fraught with consequnces
for Black Americans. But while the Presi-
dent's appointees remained obdurate and
essentially united in the majority jury
case, Justice Stewart, the author of the
Kirby plurality, dissented. Mr. Justice
White, Kirby's laconic dissenter, shifted
positions with Stewart and voted to affirm
the conviction.3 6 The White opinion in
Johnson v. Louisiana upheld the consti-
tutionality of provisions in both the state
constitution and Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure which permitted felony convic-
tions where nine of twelve jurors were
convinced of the defendant's guilt.37 His
opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon affirmed
convictions in two cases where a lone
juror voted for acquittal and upheld a
conviction in another prosecution where
two jurors disagreed with the other ten
on the question of guilt.
3 8
Although Justice Powell provided the
decisive vote, as he did in Kirby, he again
refused to sign the opinion, taking a
more restrained and one must say, less
radical view of the situation than did the
other Nixon conservatives. "In an un-
broken line of cases reaching back into
the late 1 800's," said Powell, "the Jus-
tices of this Court have recognized, vir-
tually without dissent, that unanimity is
one of the indispensable features of fed-
eral jury trial."3 9  However, qualified
Powell, "due process does not require
that the states apply the federal jury trial
right with all its gloss."4 Thus holding
the states to a different and relaxed stand-
ard, a majority of the Court decided that
a majority jury verdict somehow met the
requisites of due process in a state court
prosecution, for example, of a grocery
store robbery, but would be unconstitu-
tional in a federal court prosecution for
a bank robbery. Of all the conceivable
glosses on the Federal jury trial right, it
seems curious that the requirement of a
unanimous jury would be characterized
as mere gloss, and not the bedrock of the
Federal right. Perhaps what we are
watching in this decision is the beginning
of a film of Supreme Court incorporation
decisions run in reverse - a process of
disincorporation.
41
Justice White's sanction of state elimi-
nation of what had been treasured for
33. Id. at 695.
34. Id. at 696.
35. Id. at 691
36. As far as minority defendants are concerned, the net
result is the same - a new "working majority" has
emerged to check further enlargement of the rights of
the accused.
37. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
38. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
39. 406 U.S. 356 at 369.
40. Id. at 371.
41. The image of the motion picture camera is that of
John Holland, a third year UCLA law student, whose
discussions were invaluable in the preparation of this
article.
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literally centuries 2 as a star in the Anglo-
American constellation of criminal jus-
tice safeguards was divided between the
two opinions. In Johnson, White argued
that the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is satisfied where nine
jurors agree as to the defendant's guilt
just as much as if all 12 concur. The
number of jurors applying the standard
is not part of the reasonable doubt formu-
lation. The standard exists apart from the
number of persons who apply it. "Of
course," concludes White in his tour de
force of rationalization, "the State's proof
could perhaps be regarded as more cer-
tain if it had convinced all 12 jurors in-
stead of only nine; it would have been
even more compelling if it had been re-
quired to convince and had, in fact, con-
vinced 24 or 36 jurors. But the fact re-
mains that nine jurors - a substantial
majority of the jury - were convinced
by the evidence. In our view disagree-
ment of three jurors does not alone estab-
lish reasonable doubt, particularly when
such a heavy majority of the jury, after
having considered the dissenters' views,
remains convinced of guilt. That rational
men disagree is not in itself equivalent to
a failure of proof by the State, nor does
it indicate infidelity to the reasonable
doubt standard.
43
In Apodaca, White "disposed" of the
argument that split jury verdicts violated
the 14th Amendment's Due Process
Clause. In the least convincing part of
both opinions, White argued that the con-
clusive historical evidence that the fram-
ers of the Constitution meant unanimous
juries when they spoke of the jury con-
cept was inconclusive. 44 However, the
heart of Apodaca's plurality is its discus-
sion of the role of the jury in contempor-
ary society. White argued that the major
function of the jury "lies in the interposi-
tion between the accused and his accuser
of the common sense judgment of a group
of laymen. 45 Such a role was fulfilled, in
White's view, regardless of the division
among the jury on the question of guilt.
The fact of the consideration and delib-
eration was sufficient.
Finally, and of most relevance to
Blacks and minority groups, White de-
nies that unanimity is indispensible for
effective application of the requirement
that juries constitute a cross-section of
the community. First, argued that a cross-
section was not required in every case,
only that no section be systematically ex-
cluded. 46 And in a phrase terrifying for
its ambiguity, White declared, "No group
...has the right to block convictions; it
has only the right to participate in the
overall legal processes by which criminal
guilt and innocence are determined.' 
7
Second, White argued that the power to
forestall convictions was not necessary in
order for minority jurors to be heard
(racial or otherwise). White was either
unaware of, or unwilling to concede or
deal with, the substantial possibilities, un-
leashed by his decision, of a white major-
ity overriding the views of a Black minor-
ity on irrational grounds.48
42. "The origins of the unanimity rule are shrouded in
obscurity, although it was only in the latter half of the
14th century that it became settled that a verdic had
to be unanimous. See I Holdsworth, A History of Eng-
lish Law 318 (1956); Thayer, The Jury and Its Devel-
opment, 5 Harv. L. Rev. (pts 1 and 2), 249, 295, 296
(1892)." Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407 n. 2
(1972).
43. 406 U.S. 356 at 362.
44. 406 U.S. 404. Cf. Justice Douglas' discussion about the
Framers' intent, 406 U.S. 356 at 381-383. As Douglas
suggests, "[tihe unanimous jury have been so imbedded
in our legal history that no one would question its
constitutional position . i..." d. at 382 n.1.
45. 406 U.S. 404 at 410.
46. Id. at 413.
47. Id.
48. Evidence abounds, however, that white juries are cap-
able of deciding cases on the "irrational" grounds of
racial prejudice. "Harold Garfinkel, who examined 821
homicides in to counties of North Carolina between
1930 and 1940, concluded that proportionately few in-
dictments were made (94 percent) when Negroes killed
whites. Of those charged with first degree murder, 28
percent of the whites who killed Negroes, but only 15
percent of the Negroes who killed whites, were acquit-
ted.
". Guy B. Johnson studied 220 homicide cases in
Richmond, Virginia, from 1930 to 1939, and 330 homi-
cides in five counties of North Carolina from 1930 to
1940. There were five cases of whites killing Negroes,
but not a single conviction, and 24 cases of Negroes
killing whites, of which 22 resulted in conviction." M.
Wolfgang and B. Cohen, Crime and Race 77 (1970).
Giving serious consideration to the question of
whether white juries are sometimes racially biased is
akin to seriously considering whether segregation bene-
fits Blacks. Both propositions, as Professor Charles L.
Black said of the latter, forces one to take refuge in
"one of the sovereign perogatives of philosophers -
that of laughter." Black, The Lawfulness of the Segre-
gation Decisions, 69 Yale L. J. 421, 424 (1959).
For a general consideration of bias among white jurors,
see Minimizing Racism in Jury Trials (A. Fagan, ed.
1969), especially excerpts of the testimony of Dr. Ber-
nard Diamond who testified in one of the prosecutions
of Black Panther leader Huey P. Newton that white
racism affects the perceptions, judgment and behavior
of a white person. "[Gliven what we know about the
pervasiveness and subtlety of prejudice towards Negroes
in America, we question whether the voir dire, as con-
ventionally conceived and traditionally used, is adequate
any longer to the task of identifying enmity or bias
toward Black defendants among prospective jurors." Id.
at 216.
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The court split, as it is said, all over the
lot. A majority of the court agreed that
the Sixth Amendment required unani-
mous verdicts. But Powell permitted a
lesser standard for the states and thus
provided the decisive vote. Blackmun
signed the opinion, but indicated that the
logic of the split jury had its limits: "I do
not hesitate to say, either, that a system
employing a 7-5 standard, rather than a
9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me
great difficulty.
' 49
Stewart, Brennan, Marshall and Doug-
las all filed dissents. Stewart struck at the
very heart of the opinion and in a few
words demonstrated its lack of realism.
[T]oday's judgment approves the elim-
ination of the one rule that can ensure that
[universal participation of the citizenry
in the administration of criminal justice]
will be meaningful - the rule requiring
the assent of all jurors before a verdict of
conviction or acquittal can be returned.
Under today's iudgment, nine iurors can
simply ignore the views of their fellow
panel members of a different race or
class . . . . [O]nly a unanimous jury . . .
can serve to minimize the potential big-
otry of those who might convict on in-
adequate evidence, or acquit when evi-
dence of guilt was clear. And community
confidence in the administration of crimi-
nal justice cannot but be corroded under a
system in which a defendant who is con-
spicuously identified with a particular
group can be acquitted or convicted by a
jury split along group lines.50
This theme was pursued in turn by
Brennan and Marshall. Said Brennan:
"When verdicts must be unanimous, no
member of the jury may be ignored by
others. When less than unanimity is suf-
ficient, consideration of minority views
may become nothing more than a matter
of majority grace."51 Mr. Justice Mar-
shall, in one of his strongest and most
biting dissents, attacked the Court for
"cut[ting] the heart out of . . . [the de-
fendant'sl right to submit his case to a
jury, and the right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. '5 2 He also pointedly
rebuked Powell for his suggestion in the
concurrence that "removal of the unani-
mity requirement could well minimize the
potential for hung juries occasioned
either by bribery or jury irrationality. '"'
In Marshall's view, if the jury was prop-
erly selected, "the 'irrationality' that en-
ters into the deliberation process is pre-
cisely the essence of the right to a jury
trial. . . . To fence out a dissenting juror
fences out a voice from the community,
and undermines the principle on which
our whole notion of the jury now rests." 4
But of all the dissents, the most per-
suasive, in terms of legal as differentiated
from political considerations, was that of
Douglas, who saw that the majority de-
cision constituted a "radical departure
from American traditions. '55 As Douglas
indicates, one of the anomalies, if not
absurd results of the majority position, is
that "a man's property may only be taken
away by a unanimous jury vote [because
of the Seventh Amendment's requirement
of unanimity],5 yet he can be stripped
of his liberty by a lesser standard.1
5 7
Douglas argues that in every essential
feature of the application of the Bill of
Rights protections through the Four-
teenth Amendment, coextensive coverage
of the guarantees was accorded to the
citizens of the various states.- Conceding
that states should be granted flexibility
in solving social and economic ills, Doug-
las argued that "to permit States to 'ex-
periment' with the basic rights of people"
is to "open a veritable Pandora's box. For
hate and prejudice are versatile forces
that can degrade the constitutional
scheme. ... [I]n cold reality [civil rights]
touch mostly the lower castes in our soci-
ety. . . the Blacks, the Chicanos, the one-
mule farmers, the agricultural workers,
the off-beat students, the victims of the
ghetto." 59 Douglas dissented from a de-
cision which permits the states to experi-
ment with the right of the oppressed
classes to unanimous jury verdicts.
49. 406 U.S. 356 at 366.
50. Id. at 397.
51. Id. at 396.
52. Id. at 399.
53. Id. at 402.
54. Id.
55. 406 U.S. 356 at 381.
56. Citing American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464
(1897).
57. 406 U.S. 356 at 383.
58. See cases cited by Justice Douglas, 406 U.S. 356 at
384-386.
59. 406 U.S. 356 at 387.
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Though Douglas' "absolutisf' position
on the Bill of Rights was written with
characteristic forcefulness, the most sig-
nificant part of his dissent was his demon-
stration that by permitting majority juries,
the Court was permitting "prosecutors in
Oregon and Louisiana to enjoy a convic-
tion-acquittal ratio substantially greater
than that ordinarily returned by unani-
mous juries."' In exposing the danger of
"short cuts" in jury deliberation, Douglas
explained:
"[N]onunanimous juries need not de-
bate and deliberate as fully as most unani-
mous juries. As soon as the requisite ma-
jority is attained, further consideration is
not required .. .even though the dissident
jurors might, if given the chance, be able
to convince the majority. Such persuasion
does in fact occasionally occur in States
where the unanimous requirement applies.
'In roughly one case in ten, the minority
eventually succeeds in reversing an initial
majority, and these may be cases of special
importance.' One explanation for this phe-
nomenon is that because jurors are often
not permitted to take notes and because
they have imperfect memories, the for-
ensic process of forcing jurors to defend
their conflicting recollections and conclu-
sions flushes out many nuances which
otherwise would go overlooked. This col-
lective effort to piece together the puzzle
of historical truth, however, is cut short
as soon as the requisite majority is reached
in Oregon and Louisiana .... To be sure,
in jurisdictions other than these two
States, initial mnajorities prevail in the end,
but about a tenth of the time the rough
and tumble of the juryroom operates to
reverse completely their preliminary per-
ception of guilt or innocence. The Court
now extracts from the juryroom this auto-
matic check against hasty fact-finding by
relieving jurors of the duty to hear out
fully the dissenters.
'61
Douglas declared that "we have always
held that in criminal cases we would err
on the side of letting the guilty go free
rather than sending the innocent to jail.
We have required proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt 'as concrete substance for
the presumption of innocence.' That pro-
cedure has required a degree of patience
on the part of the jurors forcing them to
deliberate. Up untij today the pyize has
never seemed too high. Now a 'law and
order' judicial mood causes these bari-
cades to be lowered.
'62
II.
THE EMERGING TRIUMPH OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISIONS
Despite an occasional step forward ,6 the
Court has clearly taken steps backwards
in what increasingly appears to be a con-
scious process of withdrawing critical
protections indispensable to fairness for
the criminal accused, a disproprotionate
number of which, it goes without saying,
are Black. The rising tide of discontent,
indeed alarm, over the escalating crime
rate has seeped into the court's opinions.
Though not slavishly following the Nixon
/Mitchell/Kliendienst line,' the new Jus-
tices on the Court, along with former At-
torney General Byron White, mark the
ascendency of a law enforcement oriented
court. The two opinions discussed here
are stressed not because they are the only
opinions that undercut the advances of
the Warren Court, but principally be-
cause they are opinions that clearly have
special significance for Blacks and other
unpopular minorities.
60. Id. at 388.
61. Id. at 388-389.
62. Id. at 393.
63. See discussion p. inIra.
64. "Mr. Nixon has appointed four of the nine justcies and
is likely to appoint two more if reelected, possibly the
most important stake in the election. They form a re-
markably cohesive, conservative bloc .... Fortunately
there is another factor at work; when Oliver Wendell
Holmes ruled adversely to President Teddy Roosevelt
in a case the latter growled that he could carve a
stronger backbone out of a banana. 'It's very difficult
to know what a new member will be like until he's
there for five or 10 years because few new members
have been free and independeot before.'...
"Once you name a court yoti can't be sure of it. The
court unanimously, 8-0 (with Rehnquist not participat-
ing), tossed out Atty. Gen. John Mitchell's outrageous
contention that he had 'inherent power' to wiretap sus-
pected domestic subversives without a warrant. Again,
Chief Justice Burger ... wrote the unanimous opinion
upholding modified school busing which Mr. Nixon
finds so disappointing.
"And here in his Labor Day speech Mr. Nixon is
attacking Justice Powell, of all people, the man from
the very region which the Senate was supposed to con-
demn. The justice had the audacity to reject a plea
from Augusta, Ga. to ban school busing. 'The Powell
decision leaves no doubt whatever that only the anti-
busing legislation I have proposed will do the job,' Mr.
Nixon told the Nation." TRB, "Nixon's Radical Chal-
lenge of High Court's Power," LA Times, Oct. 4, 1972,
Pt. I1 at 7, col. 3.
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A. The Limits and Ambiguities of
Supreme Court Cases.
Over reaction is never the proper re-
sponse to Supreme Court decisions. Even
so successful an advocate as Professor An-
thony Amsterdam, who helped convince
the Court to outlaw the death penalty
(for the time being),65 has warned against
expecting too much from the Court.' As
he suggested, and the experience of de-
fense lawyers more than affirms, Supreme
Court opinions have at best an uncertain
impact on trial court decisions, and al-
most none on the police. Trial court
judges achieve nullification of the spirit,
even sometimes the letter, of the opinions
by factual constructions which steer clear
of Constitutional "shalt nots. '67 Police,
regularly testify under oath in court that
they have followed rules on the street,
which they have in fact totally disregard-
ed in making arrests. 68
And even if the police follow the de-
cisions, and the trial courts apply the law
in the spirit of the opinions, there is still
room for doubt as to just how liberal the
liberal decisions of the Warren Court were
As one indisputably sympathetic student
of the Court has suggested, "... a careful
look at the major areas of growth reveals
that the Court's public reputation for
bold, crusading, uncompromising reforms
is a major overstatement. This Court was
not as dogmatic or as 'legislative' as some
previous courts - nor as courageous.
The pattern of moderation and compro-
mise was most clearly evident in the crim-
inal procedure decisions. . . . The most
publicized decisions may have favored
the accused, but the most important cases
in terms of nuts and bolts of the criminal
process were pro-prosecutor." 69
Interestingly, this tradition of "back-
ing and filling," seems to have lapped
over into the present Court. Thus some
of the Warren Court advances have been
consolidated, if not furthered. Gideon7"
has been extended to misdemeanors by
A rgersinger v. Hamlin71 with the Nixon
appointees concurring. Similarly, though
in varying degrees, all the Justices re-
cently agreed that Griffin v. Illinois72
ought to be extended to insure free tran-
scripts are available to appellants in mis-
demeanor cases. 73 And of course there
were the decisions outlawing the death
penalty. 74
65. See Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Com-
panion cases were argued successfully by other counsel.
66. Professor Amsterdam suggests that the court "lacks
the sort of supervisory power over the practices of the
police that is possessed by the chief of police or the
district attorney." .. . Second, because of "a back-
breaking docket.... the Court can only hear three of
four cases a year involving the treatment of criminal
suspects by the police" and is thus "uniquely unable to
take a comprehensive view of the subject of the sus-
pects' 'rights." Third, the Court "is further disabled by
the fact that almost the only law relating to police
practices or to suspects' rights is the law the Court it-
self makes by its judicial decisions .... The ubiquitous
lack of legislative and executive attention to the prob-
lems of police treatment of suspects forces the Court
into the role of lawmaker in this area and makes it
virtually impossible for the Court effectively to play
that role." Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the
Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 785, 786, 788, 790 (1970).
67. "Trial judges... and magistrates beyond belief, are
functionally and psychologically allied with the police,
their co-workers in the unending and scarifying work
of bringing criminals to book. These trial judges and
magistrates are the liuman beings that must find the
'facts' when cases involving suspects' rights go into
court.... Their factual findings resolve the inevitable
conflict between the testimony of the police and the
testimony of the suspect." Id. at 792.
See also, A. Blumberg, Criminal Justice 21-22 (1967),
where he observes that, "The legalistic rules of 'Due
Process' are in large measure ideal expressions and do
not sensitize us to the reality of the criminal court pro-
cess in its daily operations. But [the Supreme Court de-
cisions] are of great interest because they underscore
the hiatus between the stated rules and the operative
realities. We can see what happens to them as they
filter through the organizational structures designed for
their enforcement."
68. .. . [M]ost cases do not go to court. In these cases,
the 'rights' of the suspect are defined by how the police
are willing to treat him. With regard to matters of
treatment that have no evidentiary consequences and
hence will not be judicially reviewable in exclusionary
rule proceedings, the police have no particular reason
to obey the law, . . . With regard to police practices that
may have evidentiary consequences, the police are mo-
tivated to obey the law only to the extent that (1)
they are more concerned with securing a conviction
than with some other police purpose which is served
by disobeying the law (in this connection, it is worth
noting that police departments almost invariably meas-
ure their own efficienCy in terms of 'clearances by ar-
rest,' not by conviction), and (2) they think that they
can secure the evidence necessary for conviction within
the law," Amsterdam, note 67 supra, a t792-793.
69. Blasi, A Requiem for the Warren Court, 48 Texas L.
Rev. 608, 610 (1970). Professor Blasi points out that
"[t]he Warren Court legitimated the two enforcement
tactics that many authorities, including police, contend
are the most vital -stop-and-frisk and anonymous in-
formers. Both practices entail serious invasions of civil
liberties, but the need for effective law enforcement was
thought by the Court to be more important. Wiretap-
ping and electronic eavesdropping were approved....
Many of the landmark decisions were denied retroactive
effect,... For most victims of the criminal process
there are four crucial stages: bail, plea bargaining, sen-
tencing, and prison. There are gross abuses at each of
these checkpoints - Andi the Warren Court, with ample
textual ammunition mvailable in the sixth and eighth
amendments, looked the other way." Id., at 613.
For a post-Warren Court treatment of the guilty plea,
see Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
70. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
71.407 U.S. 25 (1972).
72. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
73. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1972).
74. Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v.
Texas, 408 U.S. 438 (1972).
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B. Warren Court Concerns Yield to
Burger Court Imperatives
Though a comparison of the first years
of the Burger Court with the significantly
longer history of the Warren Court might
lead to the hypothesis that the relative
achievements may be due partially to dif-
ferences in style and emphasis, the in-
creasing acrimony between the remnants
of the Warren court (frequently Brennan,
Douglas and Marshall; occasionally Stew-
art, and now and then White), and the
Nixon appointees indicates a fundamental
difference in perspective. This difference
in horizons, as suggested by the cases
here under consideration, does not augur
well for the fates of minority defendants
faced by an undeniably law enforcement-
oriented criminal justice establishment.
Even when compromising with the im-
peratives of police work, the Warren
Court perspective was filled with sym-
pathy and concern for the oppressed. As
Professor Blasi has said, the Warren
Court was "the first . . . in history that
chose to champion the downtrodden.
'" 75
In many cases the Court strove to make
a viable reality out of the words chiseled
in marble on the facade of the Supreme
Court building - "Equal Justice Under
Law." Though not entirely losing sight of
the problems of indigents and minority
groups, the Nixon appointees - particu-
larly Burger - have exhibited in their
recent criminal procedure decisions a
predominant interest in the demands of
law enforcement and the requisites for an
efficient criminal justice system with "two
basic purposes - the first to protect soci-
ety; the second to correct the wrong-
doer. ' 76 In his recent Report on Problems
of the Judiciary delivered at the Ameri
can Bar Association's 95th Annual Meet-
ing, the Chief Justice reduced the quest
for efficiency to the formula: "We must
constantly keep in mind that the duty of
lawyers and the function of judges is to
deliver the best quality of justice at the
least cost in the shortest time."
77
Since Stewart dissented in the majority
jury cases, but wrote the opinion in the
lawyerless lineup decision, it is fair to say
that though the Burger Court is obsessed
with efficiency, it is at the very least neu-
tral with respect to the racial impact of
its criminal process decisions. But, of
course, that is what is precisely disturb-
ing. The decisions indicate that for what
on occasion is a majority of the Court,
racism and discrimination have receded
in importance. Instead, law and order
and an efficient Court system are in
ascendency as paramount considera-
tions.78 The lineup ,case is calculated to
speed up the identification process,79
though probably it will be more condu-
cive to the production of lineups which
will run afoul of Stovall v. Denno. The
majority jury verdict means quicker de-
liberations, and minimizes the problem
75. Blasi, note 69 supra, at 618.
76. The phrase is from the Chief Justice's article, No Man
Is An Island, 56 A.B.A.J. 325, 326 (1970). Burger's oft-
expressed concern for the administrative problems that
beset overcrowded courts appears surfaced in his con-
currence in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189,
200-201 (1971), in which he agreed that indigent de-
fendants had a right to free transcripts but lamented
the fact that "[elvery busy court is plauged with ex-
cessive demands for free transcripts in criminal cases.
• . . Unfortunately one consequence of the advent of
the Criminal Justice Act and state counterparts is that
when costs are paid by the public, counsel are some-
times profligate in their demands, ... This is more
than a matter of costs- An affluent society ought not
be miserly in support of justice, for economy is not an
objective of the system: the real vice is the resulting
delay in securing transcripts and hence determining the
appeal."
77. The report was delivered in San Francisco on August
14, 1972 and is reprinted in the Supreme Court Report-
er, Vol. 93, No. 1 (Nov. 1, 1972).
78. The rightward drift in criminal justice is in progress on
both sides of the Atlantic. "Britain's system of crim-
inal justice, viewed as a hallmark of British society and
extolled for its honesty and fairness, is coming under
intense attack from the police, senior judges, Conserva-
tive party politicians and others worried about crime.
"Powerful voices are heard almost daily urging that
the scales of justice be tipped more in favor of the
prosecution ....
"Just as conservatives in America see hope in the new
'Nixon court' to redress what they regard as past wrongs
in building safeguards for defendants, British forces of
'law and order' are encouraged by the trends here."
Shuster, "British Criminal Justice Assailed," N.Y.
Times, August 7, 1972. at I, col. 3.
79. Early critics of Wade spoke in terms of efficiency and
economy. "Another consequence of the opinion is that
indigent defendants will have to have counsel appointed
for them (assuming they had not intelligently waived
this right). The cost of assigning counsel for untold
numbers of pre-trial identification proceedings may be
so excessive as to prohibit such proceedings entirely.
As a consequence, law enforcement may be severely
delayed. The mandatory presence of counsel at pre-
trial identifications would also prove uneconomical for
the lawyers themselves who will not be eager to per-
form these time consuming tasks, far removed from
the courtroom, and demanding little or no legal skills.
The use of lawyers primarily as professional witnesses
would be an uneconomical use of a scarce talent." Note,
U.S. v . Wade-Right to Counsel at Pre-Trial Lineup,
63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251, 260 (1968).
80. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall, the third case of the
Wade trilogy, robbed the rule requiring lawyers at line-
ups of retroactivity, but did hold that lineups held
prior to Wade could be attacked if the police pro-
cedures were "so unnecessarily suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable mistaken identification" as to
deny due process of law. Id. at 302.
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of the hung jury, thus reducing the num-
ber of retrials. In the words of an earlier
Louisiana decision the majority jury sys-
tem is designed to "facilitate, expedite,
and reduce expense in the administration
of criminal justice."81 For Justice White
such a "statuatory scheme serves a ra-
tional purpose and is not subject to con-
stitutional challenge.
82
This "speed up" in the justice system
is, of course, a less costly substitute for
more judges, more awyers, more court-
rooms, more tax dollars - the other yet
obviously less politically palatable answer
to the criminal justice crisis. Ominously,
however, while conservative justices and
judges devise or approve time and money
saving strategems at the expense of due
process, politicians allocate a dispropor-
tionate share of public resources to the
police and enforcement arms of the crim-
inal justice system.8 3 The clamor for safe
streets is thus met with official action.
But as Chief Justice Burger has himself
recognized: "Prosecutors could win every
prosecution, convict every defendant and
imprison every guilty person; yet society
would still fail." 84 Burger was speaking
of the scandalous prison conditions and
the problem of recidivism which perme-
ate American criminal justice. High con-
viction rates are deceptive if prisoners are
paroled only to be recycled back into the
penitentiaries. Yet the demands of due
process are of greater consequence than
an efficient prosecutorial system and a
prison system which reforms instead of
represses. For the problem of a fair and
humane judicial system overlaps an ef-
fective approach to the problem of cor-
rections. The process of reconciliation
commences when the suspect is first ap-
prehended. As the "great teacher, '85 the
government, from cop on the beat to
Supreme Court Justice must show a
scrupulous concern for "fairness" and
"eqtial justice" if those convicted are to
be reconciled with the system. There can
be no reconciliation where those charged
with crimes believe the system essentially
and fundamentally unjust.
86
Clearly, a jury system which places
minority jurors in an advisory role, which
robs them of the only real power they
have to persuade others to listen to their
point of view, satisfies neither the requi-
sites of participation nor the ethical de-
mands of fairness. A jury system which
places a premium on power rather than
consensus has within it the seeds of a per-
vasive sense of powerlessness and aliena-
tion.87 Finally, a criminal justice system
which asks Blacks and other racial mi-
norities to trust thxe po'ice, the oxe secztor
of the establishment they have learned to
fear and distrust most,88 which permits
the police to exclude officers of the court
from the critical process of identification,
can hardly be said to place sufficient em-
phasis upon the appearance, 89 let alone
the substance of fairnessY0
81. State v. Lewis, 56 So. 893, 894 (1911)
82. 406 U.S. 356 at 363.
83. In the 1969-1970 fiscal year, the State of California
alone spent $147,259,556 on law enforcement agencies
(such as the Catjifotia Higtaway Patrol) and alied.
systems, but only $7,967,055 on the Supreme and Ap-
pellate courts. Not included in the State statistics are
the hundreds of millions spent on municipal police
forces. It is to understate the situation to say that
there has been a disproportion between the amount
spent on the structures of enforcement and the funds
allocated to those sectors of the criminal justice system
concerned both with the rights of the accused and the
rehabilitation of offenders. Certainly the manpower
needs of the courts have gone unmet, not only with
respect to the number of judges and supporting court
personnel, but even more so in the provision of com-
petent counsel upon whom rests the burden of making
the adversary system of justice function. "It is obvious
that neither the prosecution nor the defense side is ade-
quately financed under many, if not most, of the State
systems." Silverstein, Manpower Requirements in the
Administration of Criminal Justice in Task Force Re-
port: The Courts 152, 158 (Task Force on Administra-
tion of Justice, The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967).
84. Burger, No Man Is An Island, 56 A.B.A.J. 325, 328
(1970).
85. "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its ex-
ample." Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Olmstead v.
U.S., 278 U.S. 438, 485 (19
28
).
86. "The frustrations of powerlessness have led some Ne-
groes to the conviction that there is no effective alter-
native to violence as a means of achieving redress of
grievances, and of 'moving the system.' These frustra-
tions are reflected iol alienation and hostility toward
the institutions of law and government and the white
society which controls them, and in the reach toward
racial consciousness and solidarity reflected in the slo-
gan 'Black Power.' " Report of the National Connis-
sioi on Civil Disorders 5 (1968).
87. Black economist and nationalist David H. Swinton has
written that "[slegregation . . . is clearly only a symp-
tom of the lack of effective power in the Black com-
munity. It is not itself the cause of the myriad prob-
lems confronting the Black community in the area of
education and elsewhere. To attack the symptom may
do nothing at all to eradicate the disease .... The true
cause of the Black problem is the lack of basic eco-
nomic, political and social power, as is indicated by
the Black people's iriability to take the decisions and
allocate the resources that are required to deal with
the Black situation. This lack of power results from
white dominance of the instruments and processes of
power." Quoted by Charles V. Hamilton in The Na-
tionalist Versus the Iitegrationist, The New York Times
Magazine, Oct. 1, 1912, pt. 1, at p. 38.
88. Malcolm X expressed the dominant and pervasive
Black community view of the police when he said,
"Harlem is a police state; the police in Harlem, their
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presence is like occupation forces, like an occupying
army. They're not in Harlem to protect us; they're not
in Harlem to look out for our welfare; they're in Har-
lem to protect the interests of the businessmen who
don't even live there." G. Breitman ed., Malcohn X
Speaks FF (G. Breitman ed. 1966).
Government studies indicate Malcolm's rhetoric is the
tip of an iceberg of hatred and distrust. "It may be
paradoxical that the same people who are most victim-
ized by crime are most hostile to the police, but it is
not remarkable. In view of the history of race relations
in America and of the ghetto conditions in which most
minority-group members live, doubt about American
ideals and resentment against authority are to be ex-
pected among Negroes, Puerto Ricans and Mexican-
Americans.... Throughout the country minority-group
residents have grievances not just against society as a
whole, but specifically against the police." The Chal-
lenge of Crime in a Free Society, A Report by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration oj Justice 99 (1967).
A year later, after the Black uprisings of 1967, the
Kerner Commission echoed the Crime Commission find-
ings: "To some Negroes police have come to symbolize
white power, white racism, and white repression. And
the fact is that many police do reflect and express
these white attitudes. The atmosphere of hostility and
cynicism is reinforced by a widespread belief among
Negroes in the existence of police brutality and in a
'double standard' of police protection - one for Ne-
groes and one for whites." Report of The National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders 5 (1968).
89. "[O]nly a unanimous jury ... can serve to minimize
the potential bigotry of those who might convict on
inadequate evidence, or acquit when evidence of guilt
was clear .... And community confidence in the admin-
istration of criminal justice cannot but be corroded
under a system in which a defendant who is conspicu-
lously identified with a particular group can be acquit-
ted or convicted by a jury split along group lines." Jus-
tice Stewart dissenting in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 366, 398 (1972).
90. "The requirement that the verdict of the jury be unani-
mous, surely as important as . . . other constitutional
requisites, preserves the jury's function in linking law
with contemporary society. it provides the simple and
effective method endorsed by centuries of experience
and history to combat th injuries to the fair administra-
tion of justice that can be inflicted by community pas-
sion and prejudice." Id. at 399.
APPENDIX*
Lawyers at Los Angeles Lineups
During May of 1971, 360 lawyers and
50 judges, members of the Los Angeles
Criminal Courts Bar Association, were
asked about their experiences with line-
ups held under the Wade-Gilberta aegis.
In essence, the survey revealed that of the
84 respondents, most of them regarded
the safeguards available as a result of
Wadeb as minimal, had widely disparate
notions about the limits of their interven-
tion at the police station, and were far
more concerned with the defense of their
clients than they were with hampering
police efforts at curbing crime.
In addition to providing evidence as to
how lawyers interpret the Supreme Court
opinion which thrust lawyers into a new
role without guidelines for their conduct,
the survey results indicated that defense
lawyers, many of them with Warren
Court-conditioned reflexes (and tradi-
tional notions of the lawyers as hired gun)
are in a terribly ambiguous position rep-
resenting defendants at the station house
lineup where they confront the police on
the front lines of crime. The professional
and ethical problems that inhere in the
situation are apt to multiply now that
Kirby permits the police to exclude law-
yers from a substantial percentage of the
lineups, thereby robbing Wade of some
of its "moral" force, and given the Su-
preme Court's continued failure to sug-
gest guidelines governing counsel's role
at lineups.
The results of the survey are presented
in the following order: (1) a description
of the personal characteristics of the re-
spondents; (2) opinions regarding proper
behavior at a lineup; (3) estimates of the
effect on juries of unfair lineups; (4)
opinions on potential reform of lineup
procedures, and (5) attitudes on ethical
problems presented by lineup participa-
tion.
*Andrew Friedman of the California Bar, Alice L. McGee
of FundScope magazine, and Michael J. Strumwasser as-
sisted in the design of the questionnaire, the analysis of
the responses and the preparation of this Appendix.
Generous support from the UCLA Center for the
Study of Afro-American Life and Culture was invaluable
in the conduct and analysis of the survey which was
the basis for this Appendix.
a. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v. Calif.,
388 U.S. 263 (1963).
b. Id.
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THE SAMPLE
Of the 84 respondents, seven (8.3%)
were judges. Sixty-three of the attorneys
(75% of all respondents) were defense
counsel, the other 14 (16.7%) being
prosecutors. A large majority, 79.8%,
characterized their practices as being
principally concerned with the criminal
law. Table 1 shows the distribution of
criminal law practice among the respond-
ents; it indicates that roughly half of these
lawyers spend more than three-quarters
of their time in criminal law practice.
As a group, the respondents are rela-
tively experienced attorneys, averaging
about a decade of practice. See Table 2
for the breakdown of the sample accord-
ing to years of practice.
Surprisingly, a majority of the respond-
ents (60.7%) had never been present at
a lineup as a defense attorney (ironically,
perhaps a reflection of the fact that the
Public Defender represents most defend-
ants in lineups typically staged prior to
the formal commencement of judicial
proceedings), c This left 32 respondents
who had been present at lineups. Of these
32, nine (28.1% ) had attended only one
or two lineups, 12 (37.5%) at three or
four lineups, eight (25%) at five to 10
lineups, and only three (9.4%) had been
present at more than 10 lineups. One of
the 32 declined to answer the question
whether he had ever been counsel at an
unfair lineup, and the remaining 31 split
almost evenly: 16 said they had experi-
enced unfairness and 15 said they had
not. Almost all who said they had ex-
perienced an unfair lineup objected to
some feature of the procedure that caused
too much contrast between their client
and the others. Table 3 summarizes their
complaints. All 16 said they expressed
their objections at the time to the officer
in charge, 13 only by complaining but
two by refusing to continue. (One didn't
say he objected.) Of the 16 who ob-
jected, seven said their objection was suc-
cessful and nine said they were unsuccess-
TABLE 1
Types of Legal Practices of Respondents
Percent of Cumulative
Practice Devoted Percent of Percent of
to Criminal Law Respondents Respondents
Less than 25% 6.7% 6.7%
25% - 40% 10.7% 17.3%
41% -60% 16.0% 33.3%
61% -75% 10.7% 44.0%
76% - 90% 8.0% 52.0%





Percent of Percent of
Years of Practice Respondents Respondents
2 or less 2.5% 2.5%
3 - 5 32.9% 35.4%
6- 8 15.2% 50.6%
9-11 12.7% 63.3%
12- 15 8.9% 72.2%
16-20 17.7% 89.9%
21-25 5.1% 94.4%
26 or more 5.1% 100.0%
TABLE 3
Objections to Lineups at which
Respondent was Defense Counsel
Objection to a Number
Lineup at which Respondent Raising this





Too Few in Line 1
Exclusion of Counsel 1
Other miscellaneous 6
c. See pp _. supra.
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PROPER BEHA VIOR AT LINEUPS
There is some evidence that the re-
spondents viewed themselves as being
more liberal than they really are. Only
28.7% said they felt defense counsels'
role at lineups should be passive rather
than active. (65.7% favored activism
and 3.7% said he should be both.) How-
ever, in the battery of questions concern-
ing what lawyers should be permitted or
required to do when faced with an unfair
lineup, roughly 50% favored none of the
actions except stating objections. The dis-
tribution of the responses to these ques-
tions is given in Table 4.
The respondents' consensus regarding
the relative sensitivity of various ways of
achieving lineup fairness described in the
questionnaire was interesting. One meas-
ure, of course, was the percent who would
neither have permitted nor required each
act of protest set out in the questionnaire.
For statistical reasons, this procedure did
not actually measure accurately the cu-
mulative preferences of all respondents.
Thus Scalogram Analysis was used to
construct from the eight questions a
"Guttman Scale" of vigorous defense
techniques.d Using this technique, it was
discovered that the respondents tended to
rate the various acts in the following
order, ranging from least to most objec-
tionable:
1. state objections
2. request specific gestures by persons
in lineup
3. request specific clothes for persons
in lineup
4. insist on specific composition of
lineup
5. request members of lineup to speak
6. insist on specific procedures
7. cross-examine the witness
8. strenuously object.
Note that the lawyers felt raising objec-
tions was relatively mild, but raising them
strenuously was comparatively intoler-
able. Note also the extreme sensitivity
to placing any pressure on witnesses -
perhaps for fear of intimidation. There is
also more tolerance of defense counsels'
influence on the composition and appear-
ance of the lineup than on its procedures.
Generally, the respondents appeared to
resist any act that made the lawyer per-
sonally conspicuous.
d. The scale has a coefficient of reproducibility 0.8125,
which is 23.5% above minimum marginal reproducibil-
ity, and a coefficient of scalability of 0.5563. These num-
bers are somewhat low, indicating that the respondents
were not in complete agreement that this list of defense
counsels' acts lies on a one-dimensional scale, suggest-
ing a complex perception of multiple issues involved in
setting defense attorneys' standards. Nonetheless, these
results are potentially useful to assess the resistence of
the bar to introduction of various defense tactics.
The mathematical technique for the analysis is dis-
cussed in W. S. Torgeson, Theory and Methods of
Scaling (1958) and Edwards, On Guttman Scale Analy-
sis, 8 Educational Psychology Measurement 313 (1948).
TABLE 4








Ask persons in lineup to speak
Ask persons in lineup to wear
specific clothes
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It is interesting to compare the re-
sponses to these questions with the self-
characterized preference of the attorney
for an active versus passive role at line-
ups. While those claiming a preference
for active defense counsel at lineups gen-
erally seemed more tolerant of most acts
by attorneys, the differences between the
two groups were small. There was no sig-
nificant difference between the propon-
ents of an active lawyer and those favor-
ing a passive lawyer in receptiveness to
attorneys raising objections or requesting
members of the lineup to say or wear
specific things. Regarding the remaining
five acts (items 3-8 on the scale), there
was a statistically significant but small
correlation between the tendency to pre-
fer active defenses and to accept these
acts; the correlation never exceeded 0.26.
This relationship is rather mild and can
be explained in only two ways: Either
the respondents were not candid in their
self-evaluation, wanting to appear more
tolerant of active attorneys than they ac-
tually are, or they view the eight acts as
not constituting an "active" defense. One
possibility is that though 67.5% of the
lawyers said they preferred an active de-
fense, the number is far smaller - per-
haps falling between a third and a half.
Twelve respondents felt that additional
acts by defense attorneys should be per-
mitted: four called for written objections,
two said there should be ad-vance agree-
ment over procedures; two wanted a tape
recording of the lineup (videotape?), one
thought separate witnesses should be
present, two said the attorney should re-
fuse to allow the lineup to be completed,
and one simply called for a "fair lineup."
A considerable majority of the re-
spondents felt that the appropriate party
to whom requests should be taken was
the officer in charge. The full distribu-
tion of the opinions of the 65 respondents
who answered this question is given in
Table 5.
The professional position of the re-
spondent had a mild influence on his
view of appropriate lineup behavior for
defense counsel. Judges were slightly less
tolerant of vigorous defenses than either
prosecutors or defense attorneys. Surpris-
ingly, prosecutors were about as tolerant
of the various acts as were defense at-
torneys. The most sizeable differences oc-
cured over the following acts: cross-ex-
anination of the witness (85.7% of the
judges and 78.6% of the prosecutors
were opposed, compared to only 49.2%
of the defense attorneys); allowing coun-
sel to request persons in the lineup to
say specific words (opposed by 85,7%
of the judges and only 50.0% of the
prosecutors and 49.2% of the defense
attorneys); specifying clothes to be worn
by persons in the lineup, (opposed by
85.7% of the judges, 44.4% of the de-
fense attorneys, and 28.6% of the prose-
cutors); and specifying gestures for per-
sons in the lineup (opposed by the same
85.7% of the judges but only 42.9% of
the defense attorneys and 35.7% of the
prosecutors).
TABLE 5
















EFFECTS ON A JURY
LINEUP
Respondents Favoring












Only 22 respondents (26.8%) felt
that participation by an attorney through
completion of an unfair lineup would be
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taken by a jury to imply ratification of
its procedures; 50 (61.0%) felt it would
not. Another ten (12.2%) gave answers
amounting to "perhaps." Two respond-
ents failed to respond to this problem.
The respondents' answers to this question
appear to be independent of their profes-
sional position: Among defense attorneys
27.9% said completion would bias the
jury compared to 28.6% of the prose-
cutors and 14.3% of the judges. Clearly
defense and prosecution attorneys are in
agreement; given the small number of
judges in the sample, it is impossible to
assert that the distribution of their opin-
ions is significantly different. Similarly,
the distributions of opinions does not ap-
pear to be affected by whether the at-
torney's experience is in criminal or civil
practice, nor by whether he has ever been
present at a lineup.
The 22 who feared bias plus four of
the ten who said bias might result, an-
swered the question concerning jury in-
structions. Twenty-two of the 26 (84.6%)
said instructions to the effect that com-
pletion of the lineup does not imply de-
fense ratification would help counter the
bias. Only four of the 26 (15.4%) said
instructions would not help.
Fifty-five respondents suggested addi-
tional means to counteract the assump-
tion of ratification. The suggestions are
listed in Table 6.
TABLE 6
Other Means of Avoiding Jury Bias
Suggestion Number Suggesting
Argument to Jury
Other Witnesses to Lineup
Lawyer's Testimony
Instructions
Making it a Matter of Law
Written Record of
Lineup Session
Tape Recording of Lineup
Movies or Photos of Lineup
LINEUP REFORMS
There appears to be some sentiment in
the criminal bar for new judicial-admin-
istrative rules in lineup procedures, but
little consensus for any specific reforms.
Fifty-eight respondents answered the
question asking "[a]re new judicial/ad-
ministrative rules necessary in this area?",
of whom 39 (67.2% of those answering,
46.4% of the total sample) said new
rules were needed and 19 (32.8% of
those answering and 22.6% of the total
sample) said they were not. This would
seem to imply fairly widespread dissatis-
faction with existing rules, but two factors
suggest some caution in drawing conclu-
sions: First, the "self-selection problem"
is of greatest concern in a question like
this one; persons interested in reform are
much more likely to go to the trouble
of answering this kind of survey than
those against or indifferent. Second, some
of the 26 respondents who failed to an-
swer this question were probably answer-
ing with a "silent no." Thus perhaps the
most prudent conclusion is that a major-
ity of those who expressed an opinion on
the subject favor new rules.
As might be expected, the respondent's
present position was highly influential in
formation of the opinion on whether new
rules are needed. Among defense attor-
neys 79.5% favored new rules, while
only 40% of the prosecutors wanted new
rules; and none of the judges said new
rules were necessary while four of the
seven said they were not needed. These
differences are statistically significant at
the .01 level. In contrast, the opinions
of the respondents were unaffected by
whether they had predominantly civil or
criminal law practices, nor by their pre-
vious experience with lineups.
Table 7 shows that there is hardly any
unanimity regarding what new rules are
necessary. Of the 39 who said they felt
new rules are called for, 33 specified
some reform, and their opinions were
scattered among ten different categories.
There is no widespread support evi-
denced in the survey for the presence of
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TABLE 7




New Rules for Lineup Staging 7
Color Photos of Lineup 6
Admit Objections 5
Movies of Lineup 5
Magistrate to Conduct Lineup 4
Record Objections 3
Require DA's Presence 3
Require Police Conducting Lineup
Entertain Objections 2
Permit Counsel to Order
Disobedience 2
Modification of Trial Rules 1
a magistrate at lineups. Of the 81 re-
spondents answering the question, only
27 (33.3%) said the presence of an in-
dependent judicial officer would be de-
sirable; 50 (61.7%) said it would not be
desirable, and four (4.9%) gave ambiva-
lent answers amounting to "maybe." On
this issue, there was no difference in the
distributions of opinions between prose-
cutors and defense attorneys (35.7% of
the prosecutors and 36.7% of defense
counsel favored the presence of a magis-
trate), but the opinions of judges differed
markedly from those of the advocates:
six of the seven judges were opposed to
new rules, with the seventh saying "may-
be." Again, answers to this question were
uninfluenced by the principal field of the
respondent's practice and by his previous
experience with lineups.
There is considerably more receptivity
to the presence of a prosecutor at the
lineup than to the presence of a magis-
trate. Again, 82 of the 84 respondents
answered the question, but here 66
(78.0%) favored the presence of a DA,
and only 18 (22.0%) were opposed.
However, the questionnaire asked about
the presence of the prosectuor immedi-
ately after the magistrate question and
this might have invited the respondent to
try to "compromise" and thereby have
slightly inflated the number of positive
responses. In any case, it is clear there is
less resistance to the presence of the DA
than to the requirement of a magistrate.
With this question, judges, prosectuors,
and defense attorneys did not appear to
be affected by their professional status;
neither were the respondents influenced
by any of the other data we have on their
practice or experience.
THE VIGOROUS DEFENSE AND
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
While nearly two-thirds of the re-
spondents felt a defense attorney should
be active rather than passive in represent-
ing clients at lineups, of 78 respondents
who answered the first question of the
survey - whether a failure to object
should constitute a waiver of objections
to the lineup - 73.1% of them (57 re-
spondents) said the failure to object
should not constitute a waiver. Only 17
(21.8%) felt it should cause forfeiture
of the objection. There were four other
opinions offered: that it should depend
on whether objection was possible; that
there should be no right to object (a re-
spondent sensing the shifting winds to the
right; that it should be a matter for the
court to decide, and that the failure to
object should merely shift the burden of
proof.
Thus, it appears that either the re-
spondents were willing to allow the de-
fense attorney the right to vigorous ac-
tivities at the lineup without requiring
their exercise, or else, again, it seems they
are less in favor of active defense counsel
than they claim. None of the personal
or professional characteristics of the re-
spondents - including professional posi-
tion - seemed to affect the responses
to this question.
A rather small number were actually
prepared to advocate acts of protest by
the attorney at the lineup. Only six said
threatening to walk out was appropriate;
11 favored actually walking out; none
favored disruption of the proceedings;
and 15 said the attorney should order his
client not to obey the officers.
PAGE 236 THE BLACK LAW JOURNAL
PAGE 237
THE BLACK LAW JOURNAL
There was very little sensitivity to the
ethical issues involved in having the at-
torney testify in behalf of his client.e
Only 23 said such testimony is unethical
while 46 said it was not. (The remaining
14 presumably found the question of
ethics too theoretical for them.) Those
who said the lawyer could ethically testify
cited 12 reasons, most of them dealing
solely with practicality and not ethics.
Twenty cited 6 reasons why it would be
unethical, which are summarized in Table
9.
TABLE 8




He's the only witness
It is necessary
It leaves the defendant's
rights unwaived
It is impractical for him not to
Consequence of duty to do all




Can get another lawyer to
represent defendant
Remote from circumstances of
the crime
Serves the interests of justice
He is available for
cross-examination
Defendant can give his consent
e. The ethical problems triggered by Wade may be grasped
from a consideration of Canon 5 of the ABA Code of
Professiorial Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 5-9
and 5-10 (1969):
"EC 5-9 Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to de-
cide in a particular case whether he will be a witness
or an advocate. If a lawyer is both counsel and wit-
TABLE 9
Why It Is Unethical for Counsel to
Testify in Client's Behalf
Number Giving
Reason that Reason
Inconsistent with role as counsel 6
Makes attorney's credibility
an issue 4




Each function weakens the
other role I
ness, he becomes more easily impeachable for interest
and thus may be a less effective witness. Conversely,
the opposing counsel may be handicapped in chal-
lenging the credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer
also appears as an advocate in the case. An advocate
who becomes a witness is in the unseemly and inef-
fective position of arguing his own credibility. The
roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent;
the function of an advocate is to advance or argue
the cause of another, while that of a witness is to
state facts objectively."
"EC 5-10 Problems incident to the lawyer-witness
relationship arise at different stages; they relate
either to whether a lawyer should accept employment
or should withdraw from employment. Regardless of
when the problem arises, his decision is to be gov-
erned by the same basic considerations. It is not ob-
jectionable for a lawyer who is a potential witness to
be an advocate if it is unlikely that he will be called
as a witness because his testimony would be merely
cumulative or if his testimony will relate only to an
uncontested issue. In the exceptional situation where
it will be manifestly unfair to the client for the lawyer
to refuse employment or to withdraw when he will
likely be a witness on a contested issue, he may serve
as advocate even though he may be a witness. In
making such decision, he should determine the per-
sonal or financial sacrifice of the client that may re-
sult from his refusal of employment or withdrawal
therefrom, the materiality of his testimony, and the
effectiveness of his representation in view of his per-
sonal involvement. In weighing these factors, it should
be clear that refusal or withdrawal will impose an
unreasonable hardslip upon "the cfien e beiore the
lawyer accepts or continues the employment. Where
the question arises, doubts should be resolved in
favor of the lawyer testifying and against his becom-
ing or continuing as an advocate."
See also Sutton, The Testifying Advocate, 41 Texas L.
Rev. 477, 481-482 (1963), where the author points out:
"Ultimately, the testifying advocate occupies the dubi-
ous and embarrassing position of one trying to argue
convincingly to the jury the strength and impartiality
of his own testimony. The dual role is too difficult;
the lawyer should not be subjected to such a riptide
of demands unless in some exceptional circumstances
fairness and duty to the client dictate otherwise....
[But] the fountainhead of the underlying policy con-
sideration [is that], in fairness to his client, a lawyer
who will be a witness should not be converted into
a more interested and thus a less effective witness
by becoming an advocate as well."
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